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CRIMINAL LAw-The United States Supreme Court has held that

before a district court can sentence longer than a range set by the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines on a ground not identified as one
for departure in either the pre-sentence report or the pre-hearing
report of the Government, FRCrP 32 requires that the court give
the parties to the action reasonable notice of the possible departure and specifically identify the grounds for such departure.
Burns v United States, US

, 111 S Ct 2182 (1991).

Between the years 1982 and 1988, petitioner, William Burns, in
his position as supervisor of the Financial Management Section of
the United States Agency for International Development, authorized the payment of agency funds into a bank account which he
had opened under an alias.1 During this period, fifty-three fraudulent payments totaling over $1.2 million were paid from the agency
into the illicit account.2 Following the Government's detection of
the scheme, Burns agreed to plead guilty to a three-count information charging him with federal crimes.3 The plea agreement stated
the parties' expectation that Burns would be sentenced pursuant
to the Guidelines of the United States Sentencing Commission
(hereinafter "the Guidelines") within a range corresponding to an
offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of I. The presentence report filed by the probation officer mirrored the plea
agreement in that it recommended a sentence within the Guideline
range and indicated an absence of factors which would warrant a
departure from the sentence range of thirty to thirty-seven
1. Burns v United States, US , 111 S Ct 2182, 2183 (1991).
2. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2183.
3. Id at 2184. The Government's information charged Burns with theft of Government funds, 18 USC § 641 (1948), making false claims against the Government, 18 USC
§ 287 (1986), and attempted tax evasion, 26 USC § 7201 (1982).
An "information" is a written accusation of a crime issued without the participation of a
grand jury. Ronald N. Boyce, Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law and Procedure § 12 at 1069
(Foundation Press, 1989).
4. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2184. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 USC § 3551
(1985), was passed as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub L No 98473, 98 Stat 1837 (1984), and provides for a system of sentencing guidelines to be utilized by
federal court judges to determine sentences based on the various offense-related and offender-related factors identified by the Guidelines of the United States Sentencing Commission. 18 USC § 3553(a)(4), (b) (1985). These Guidelines appear at 18 USC Appendix.
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months.5 Both Burns and the Government reviewed the pre-sentence report and neither party filed objections." Despite the existence of the plea agreement and the recommendations of the presentence report, the district court announced at the completion of
the sentencing hearing that it was departing upward from the
Guidelines sentencing range, and Burns was sentenced to sixty
months imprisonment.
Burns appealed the sentence imposed by the district court, arguing that Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter "Rule 32") obliged the court to furnish advance notice to
the parties of its intent to depart from the Guidelines.8 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the sentence,9 stating that Rule 32 does not contain express language requiring advance notice of a sua sponte1 ° departure by a district
court, and that the imposition of such a requirement in the absence of such statutory language would be inappropriate.1 1
The Supreme Court granted certiorori, noting that several other
circuits had interpreted Rule 32 as requiring a district court to
provide notice of a sua sponte departure upward from the applicable Guidelines sentencing range.12 In a five to four decision, the
5. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2184. FRCrP 32(c)(2) requires that a probation officer prepare
a pre-sentence report and submit it to the court before the imposition of sentence. The
report must contain a classification of the offense and of the defendant under the categories
established by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to Section 994(a) of title 28 that the
probation officer believes to be applicable to the defendant's case; the kinds of sentence and
the sentencing range suggested for such a category of offense committed by such a category
of defendant pursuant to 28 USC § 994(a)(1); and an explanation by the probation officer of
any factors that may indicate that a sentence of a different kind or of a different length
from one within the applicable guideline would be more appropriate under all the circumstances. FRCrP 32(c)(2).
6. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2184.
7. Id.
The district court set forth the following three reasons for the departure: (1) the extensive duration of [Burns'] criminal conduct; (2) the disruption to governmental
functions caused by [Burn's] criminal conduct; and (3) [Burns'] use of his tax evasion
offense to conceal his theft and false claims offenses.
Id.
8. Id.
9. 893 F2d 1343, 1348 (DC Cir 1990).
10. "Sua sponte" is a Latin term meaning "of his or its own will; voluntary; without
prompting or suggestion." Black's Law Dictionary 742 (West, 5th ed 1983).
11. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2184. The court of appeals did not interpret the language of
FRCrP 32(a)(1), which requires "an opportunity to comment upon. . . matters relating to
the appropriate sentence," as a directive to a district court to provide advance notice of a
sua sponte departure from the Guidelines. Id.
12. Id. The Court cited the following circuit court cases which had read the notice
requirement into Rule 32: United States v Palta, 880 F2d 636, 640 (2d Cir 1989); United
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Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, 13 focusing on
the issue of whether Congress, in enacting the Sentencing Reform
Act, intended that a district court be free to depart upward from
the Guidelines on its own initiative and contrary to the expectations of the parties without advance notice of such a departure.
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall began his analysis
with a brief review of the federal sentencing process prior to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.14 In establishing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Justice Marshall noted that Congress had removed the discretionary power of individual judges to impose
sentences on a case-by-case basis because of the "unwarranted disparities and . . . uncertainty" associated with indeterminate sen-

tencing."5 Under the Guidelines, judges now determine sentences
based on the various offense- and offender-related factors identified by the Guidelines, and a finding of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances not taken into account by the Guidelines allows the
only opportunity for variance from their "mechanical dictates."'"
The Court pointed out that in order to achieve Congress' goal of
assuring certainty and fairness in sentencing, certain procedural
reforms were needed, including amendments to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32.'1

In explaining the amendments to Rule 32 by the Sentencing Reform Act in order to effectuate the goals of Congress, the majority
opinion emphasized the role of a "focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal issues relevant to determining the
appropriate Guidelines sentence."' 8 The Court cited the various
procedural steps to be taken under Rule 32 to substantiate the
proposition that the Rule allows for a full adversarial testing of the
issues involved with sentencing. 19 Chief among these requirements
States v Nuno-Para, 877 F2d 1409 (9th Cir 1989); United States v Otero, 868 F2d 1412,
1415 (5th Cir 1989). Burns, 111 S Ct at 2184 n 1.
13. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2184.
14. Id. The Sentencing Reform Act appears at 18 USC § 3551. See note 4.
15. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2184. The term "indeterminate sentencing" generally means a
sentence that involves incarceration for a flexible period of time. The judge fixes a maximum and minimum term, and the actual amount of time to be served is determined by an
administrative agency such as a parole board. Frederick A. Hussey, David E. Duffee, Probation, Parole and Community Field Services 107 (Harper & Row, 1980).
16. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2184-85.
17. Id at 2185.
18. Id.
19. Id at 2185-86. FRCrP 32(c)(2) directs the probation officer to prepare a pre-sentence report addressing all matters germane to the defendant's sentence. FRCrP 32(c)(3)(A)
and (C) provide that the report must be disclosed to the parties at least ten days before the
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is the text of Rule 32(a)(1), which affords the parties the express
right "to comment upon . . . matters relating to the appropriate
sentence."2 o
The Government argued that Rule 32 does not contemplate a
notice requirement where a district court has decided to make a
sua sponte departure upward. In making this argument, the Government relied on the fact that notice is specifically provided for in
other sections of Rule 32.21 The Government reasoned that, because an express notice requirement does not exist regarding a sua
Congress intended to deny the parsponte departure by the court,
22
ties notice of this possibility.
The majority found the Government's argument unconvincing in
light of the provision in Rule 32(a)(1) allowing the parties the opportunity to comment upon matters relating to the appropriate
sentence.2 s In the Court's opinion, the Government's reading of
Rule 32 rendered the express right to comment upon the terms of
sentence meaningless because "the right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed. 2 4 The Court cautioned that
an inference should not be drawn from congressional silence when
it is contrary to the textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.2 5
The majority opinion went on to cite two additional reasons for
its disagreement with the Government's analysis. First, the Court
pointed out that the inference which the Government drew from
congressional silence with regard to sua sponte departures was inconsistent with the Rule's purpose of promoting focused, adversarial resolution of the issues related to a criminal sentence.26 The
Justices believed this was so because the parties, not knowing the
basis for departure, would not be afforded the opportunity to prepare a rebuttal to the court's grounds for departure. The sentence
sentencing, affording the parties an opportunity to file responses or objections. FRCrP
32(a)(1) provides that at the sentencing hearing the court must afford the parties an opportunity to comment upon the presentence report and on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence.
20. Id at 2186, quoting FRCrP 32(a)(1).
21. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2186. Specifically, the Government argued that 32(c)(3)(A)
mandates a ten-day notice to the parties regarding the contents of the pre-sentence report.
Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. See notes 19 and 20.
24. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2186, citing Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 US 306, 314 (1950).
25. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2186.
26. Id at 2187.
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would then be imposed, untested by the adversarial process contemplated by Congress.2 Secondly, raising a due process concern,
the Court indicated that the meaning attached by the Government
to Congress' silence in Rule 32 was opposite to the meaning the
Court had attached to silence in a number of similar settings.2 8 In
support of this contention, the Court cited decisions where silence
had been interpreted to afford both notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard2 9 and likewise where the Court had inferred
other statutory protections essential to assuring procedural fairness.30 Further expanding on the due process issue, the Court explained that if they were to read Rule 32 as dispensing with notice,
they would then be faced with the serious question of whether notice in this setting is mandated by the Due Process Clause.3 1 The
Court reasoned that the interpretation it had afforded Rule 32 was
in harmony with the enduring principal of law that, "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid
such problems, unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress." 2
Based on the above analysis, the Supreme Court held that before
a district court could depart upward on a ground not identified for
upward departure, either in the pre-sentence report or in a prehearing submission by the Government, Rule 32 requires that the
district court give the parties reasonable notice that such a ruling
is contemplated. The Court concluded that 'Burns had not received the notice to which he was entitled under Rule 32, and
therefore his case was remanded to the court of appeals for further
proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. 4
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices O'Connor,
White and Chief Justice Rehnquist,3 5 chastised the majority for its
failure to recognize the detail with which the Sentencing Reform
Act expressly provided for procedures to be followed in imposing
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2187, citing American Power & Light Co. v SEC, 329 US 90,
107-08 (1946), and The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 US 86, 99-101 (1903).
30. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2187.
31. Id.
32. Id, citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v FloridaGulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades
Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988).
33. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2187.
34. Id.
35. Id at 2188. The Chief Justice joined only as to Part I of the dissent. Id.
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criminal sentences under Rule 32 as amended by the Act. 6 Stating
that the majority had accomplished "not a construction of the
Rule, but an enlargement of it," Justice Souter in a two part analysis outlined the dissenters' disagreement with the majority's
reasoning."'
Part I of the dissent focused on the detailed procedural requirements under the Rule, specifically the explicit notice directives required in at least three different phases of the pre-sentencing process.38 Justice Souter reasoned that these express notice
requirements appearing in Rule 32 reflect Congress' disinclination
to rely on implied notice requirements.3 9 Additionally, Part I of the
dissent pointed out that the absence of specific notice did not
render meaningless the opportunity of the defendant to comment
on matters relevant to sentencing. This is because the Sentencing
Reform Act itself provides that a court may depart from the applicable Guideline range in the event of aggravating or mitigating circumstances not adequately addressed by the Guidelines. 40 This
puts the parties on notice that departure is always a possibility
and allows counsel to gear a portion of its argument toward
departure. 4
Part II of the dissent rebutted the majority's proposition that
failing to find a notice requirement under Rule 32 in the face of a
sua sponte departure by a district court from the Guidelines raised
a serious due process question. 42 The dissent concluded that Rule
32 as written does not raise due process concerns because it provides two procedures to minimize the risk that a defendant will be
forced to serve an unreasonably long sentence outside the Guideline range. 43 The first of these protections is the opportunity for
the defendant to be heard at the sentencing hearing, realizing that
departure upward is a possibility raised by the Guidelines themselves. The second protection is the allowance for appellate review
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id at 2189-90. The three notice requirements of Rule 32 cited by Justice Souter
are: (1) notice to the defense of the probation officer's determination of the sentencing classifications and guideline range applicable to the case, (2) entitlement of the defense to the
pre-sentence report ten days prior to the sentencing hearing, and (3) that the court ensure
that defendant's counsel has had an opportunity to read and discuss the report before a
sentence is imposed. Id.
39. Id at 2189.
40. Id at 2190.
41. Id at 2190-91.
42. Id at 2191.
43. Id at 2195.
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of the sentence. 44 In sum, Justice Souter concluded that the existing process under Rule 32 provides what is due without resort to
45
the majority's notice requirement.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, prior to the passage of
the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984," federal criminal sentencing
was indeterminate. 4 Under the indeterminate system, federal law
did not contain general sentencing provisions but rather specified
the maximum term of imprisonment and the maximum fine for
each federal offense in the section that described the offense. 48 The
sentencing system was supplemented by the utilization of parole,
by which a criminal offender was returned to society under the
"guidance and control" of a parole officer at some point in time
during the term of the sentence. 4'9 The amount of time actually
served by an offender was determined by the United States Parol
Commission, which could authorize release on a discretionary
basis. 50
The indeterminate sentencing scheme was supported by the existing conventional wisdom of the twentieth century that a criminal sentence should be designed for the purposes of rehabilitating
the offender, and in the case of the dangerous offender, isolating
him from society. 1 To accomplish these goals, the federal trial
judge was given the widest discretion to suit the sentence disposition to the individual criminal.2 The result of this broad discretion
afforded to trial judges under indeterminate sentencing, coupled
with the discretion of the Parole Board, was wide disparity in
44. Id at 2195-96.
45. Id at 2196.
46. See note 4.
47. Note, Mistretta v United States: Upholding the Constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines, 40 Mercer L Rev 1429 (1989). See note 16 and accompanying text.
48. S Rep No 225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess, reprinted in US Code Cong & Admin News
3182 (1984), citing 18 USC § 3651.
49. Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 363 (1989).
50. Andrew von Hirsch, Kathleen J. Hanrahan, The Question of Parole: Retention,
Reform, or Abolition? 3 (Ballinger, 1979).
51. Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice, the Choice of Punishments (Hill and Wang,
1976). An influential piece of model legislation, the Model Sentencing Act summarized the
conventional wisdom with regard to indeterminate sentencing in stating:
Persons convicted of crime shall be dealt with in accordance with their potential for
rehabilition, considering their individual characteristics, circumstances and needs.
Dangerous offenders shall be identified, segregated and correctly treated in custody
for as long of terms as needed.
Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Sentencing Act, Second Edition, reprinted in 18 Crime and Delinquency 335 (1972).
52. Id.
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criminal sentences. 3
The so-called "Rehabilitative Ideal" 54 and the indeterminate
sentence in general became the subject of intense criticism during
the 1970s, when scholars and lawmakers alike questioned the role
of rehabilitation in federal sentencing practice. 5 Widespread dissatisfaction led to increased Congressional attention to the sentencing issue,56 and in 1971 the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws conducted extensive hearings and drafted
several proposals with regard to federal sentencing reform. 7 The
debate in Congress continued throughout the 1970s and early
1980s, culminating in the passage of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, which contained a section regarding sentencing reform.5

In passing this extensive sentencing reform legislation, Congress
identified the four basic purposes of criminal sanctions as punishment, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation, and codified
these goals under Section 3553 of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.59 The major changes in federal sentencing practice promul-

gated by the Act 60 included: (1) the abolishment of the Parole
53. S Rep No 225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess, reprinted in US Code Cong & Admin News
3182 (1984). The Senate Report cited an example of this wide disparity in noting that the
average federal bank robbery sentence under indeterminate sentencing was eleven years,
while in the northern district of Illinois the average sentence for bank robbery was five and
one-half years. The senate report noted similar discrepancies for a number of different federal offenses documented in a landmark study by the United States Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York.
54. The "Rehabilitative Ideal" refers to the theory that a criminal offense is merely
symptomatic of an inner need or conflict of an offender, and that it is the responsibility of
the criminal justice system to treat, correct and rehabilitate the offender. Hussey and Duffee, Probation,Parole and Community Field Services at 111 (cited in note 15).
55. Id at 114. Criticisms of the rehabilitive effort included: (1) overwhelming evidence
that rehabilitative programs were ineffective in reducing the rate of recidivism among criminal offenders, (2) the contention that rehabilitation is beyond the competence of the criminal justice system, and (3) the idea that society has no right to force rehabilitation on unwilling subjects. Id.
56. Note, 40 Mercer L Rev at 1432 (cited in note 47).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 18 USC § 3553(a)(2) codifies the sentencing goals as follows: (1) to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment
for the offense, (2) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, (3) to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant, and (4) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner. Id. See note 4.
60. The changes are set forth in Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 367-68
(1989).
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Commission, 61 (2) the creation of the United States Sentencing
Commission to devise guidelines to be used in sentencing, 2 (3) determinate sentencing pursuant to the Sentencing Commission
Guidelines, which sentences the offenders must serve in their entirety as reduced only by good-time credit,6 3 (4) mandatory compliance by the courts with the guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission, with discretion to depart therefrom allowed
only when aggravating or mitigating circumstances existed which
were not taken into consideration by the guidelines,64 (5) a requirement that the sentencing judge state the reasons for the sentence
imposed, documenting specific reasons for any departure from the
applicable guideline range,6 5 and (6) appellate review of the
sentence.16
Several procedural reforms were necessary to effectuate the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, 67 and Rule 32 has been
amended since the passage of the Act in order to facilitate the
achievement of Congress' goals.6 8 Two of the more substantive
changes to the Rule include the amendments to Sections 32(a) regarding the imposition
of sentence, and 32(c) regarding the pre69
sentence report.
The amendment to Rule 32(a)(1) provides that "at the sentencing hearing, the court shall afford the counsel for the defendant
and the attorney for the Government an opportunity to comment
upon the probation officer's determination and on other matters
relating to the appropriate sentence. ' 70 The official comments by
the Sentencing Commission explain this section as requiring the
court to give the defendant and the Government an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding any disputed sentencing factor.7 1 Additionally, the commentary states
that the court's resolution of disputed sentencing factors will usually have a measurable effect on the applicable punishment under
61.
62.
63.

28 USC §§ 991, 994, 995(a)(1).
Id.
18 USC § 3624(a), (b).

64. 18 USC § 3553(a), (b).
65. 18 USC § 3553(c).
66. 18 USC § 3742(a), (b).
67. See 28 USC § 991(b)(1)(B).
68. 18 USC, Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32 (Supp 1991). Rule 32 was ammended in 1984, 1986, 1987 and 1989.
69. Id.

70.

United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual,

Official Commentary, § 6A1.3 (1990).

71. Id.
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the Guidelines and therefore must be resolved with care. 2 It is for
this reason that the court must ensure that the parties have an
adequate opportunity to present relevant information prior to the
imposition of the sentence.7 3
The amendments to Rule 32(c) ensure that the pre-sentence report contains the information necessary for the court to make an
appropriate sentencing decision under the new Guidelines and require that any aggravating or mitigating circumstances be set forth
in the report.7 4 The amendments also provide that the court shall
provide the defendant and the defendant's counsel with a copy of
the pre-sentence report at least ten days before the sentencing
hearing.75 Finally, waiver of the pre-sentence report by the defendant, which had been previously permitted under Rule 32(c), is disallowed by the amendments. 6
In enforcing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the corresponding amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the appellate courts of the United States have differed in their interpretations of the requirements attendant to the new system.
Specifically with respect to Rule 32(a)(1), the various appellate
courts have disagreed as to whether and if a defendant must receive notice of an upward departure from the Guidelines by the
court in order to comply with the requirement under the Rule that
"upon...
the defendant be afforded an opportunity to comment
77
matters relating to the appropriate sentence.

This difference of opinion over the mandate of Rule 32(a)(1)
with regard to notice is set against the backdrop of case law in the
areas of procedural due process and interpretation of legislative intent. In 1950, the Supreme Court in Mullane v Hanover Bank and
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. FRCrP 32(c)(2)(B). See S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess (1983), reprinted in
US Code Cong & Admin News 3182 (1984).
75. FRCrP 32(c)(3).
76. FRCrP 32(c)(1) now permits the judge to dispense with a pre-sentence report,
but only after explaining on the record why sufficient information is already available.
United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Official
Commentary, § 6A1.1 (1990).
77. For cases generally interpreting "the opportunity to comment" in Rule 32(a)(1)

as requiring notice prior to the sentencing hearing of any intended upward departure by the
court, see United States v Palta, 880 F2d 636 (2d Cir 1989); United States v Nuno-Para,
877 F2d 1409 (9th Cir 1989); United States v Otero, 868 F2d 1412 (5th Cir 1989); United
States v Cervantes, 878 F2d 50 (2d Cir 1989). For cases contra, see United States v Burns,
893 F2d 1343 (DC Cir 1990), rev'd, 111 S Ct 2182 (1991); United States v George, 911 F2d
1028 (5th Cir 1990); United States v Hernandez, 896 F2d 642 (1st Cir 1990).
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Trust Co.7 8 set forth the enduring proposition that the fundamen-

tal requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.
"This right has little reality or worth unless one is informed
.. ,*.37 In applying this right to be informed, or more simply,
right to notice, the Supreme Court has construed such a right even
in the absence of express statutory language when the statute in
question authorizes deprivations of liberty or property.8 In American Power & Light Co. v SEC,8 l the Court rejected a constitutional
challenge to a statute allowing for SEC dissolution of corporate entities. The contention was that the statute did not expressly provide for notice and opportunity for a hearing to security holders
regarding proceedings against the corporate entity under the statute. The Court opined that despite express language requiring notice, it was fair to assume that Congress intended a requirement of
notice and an opportunity to be heard in the statute.8 2 The portion
of the American Power decision pertaining to notice was in turn
based on the decision in The Japanese Immigrant Case,83 where
the Court similarly found a notice requirement where none was
present in the statute. 4
Against this setting, the courts of appeal have been interpreting
Rule 32(a)(1), as amended by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
and attempting to decide whether a notice provision exists despite
the lack of express statutory language to that effect. In United
States v Palta,5 the defendant pleaded guilty to drug charges after attempting the sale of a controlled substance to a Drug Enforcement Administration agent in July of 1988.86 The pre-sentence report upwardly adjusted the base level sentence set forth in
the Guidelines corresponding to the defendant's crime. The base
level sentence was increased two levels for possession of a firearm
and an additional two levels for obstruction of justice by supplying
a false name.87 Under the report's recommendation, the sentencing
range as per the Guidelines was set at 121 to 151 months, and the
78.
79.
80.
SEC, 329
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

339 US 306 (1950).
Mullane, 339 US at 313.
Burns, 111 S Ct at 2187. Two such instances are American Power & Light Co. v
US 90 (1946), and The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 US 86 (1903).
329 US 90 (1946).
American Power & Light Co., 329 US at 108.
189 US 86 (1903).
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 US at 101.
880 F2d 636 (2d Cir 1989).
Palta, 880 F2d at 637.
Id.
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defendant did not contest this recommendation. 8 Despite the report's recommendation, at the close of the arguments the court announced a sentence of two concurrent terms of 25 years (300
months).8 9 In holding that the the district court had unreasonably
departed from the guidelines without articulating adequate
grounds for the departure in violation of Section 3553(b) of the
Sentencing Reform Act,90 the appellate court summarily addressed
the defendant's contention that, under Rule 32(a)(1), he was entitled to notice of any intended departure by the court and the corresponding opportunity to be heard with regard to the departure. 1
The court, citing United States v Cervantes,92 opined that adequate notice and the opportunity to contest an upward departure
from the guidelines are indispensible to sentencing uniformity and
fairness."
In Cervantes, the defendant entered into a plea agreement with
94
the government after being charged with drug-related offenses.
At the sentencing hearing, during a sidebar with counsel, the sentencing judge indicated that he would issue a sentence within the
applicable Guideline range.9 5 Despite this statement, at the conclusion of the hearing the judge indicated that an upward departure
was warranted and imposed a sentence nearly double the recommended Guidelines range sentence.9 In reasoning very similar to
that utilized in Palta, the appellate court held that the district
court had not adequately articulated the grounds for upward departure as required by Section 3553(c)(2) of the Act.97 In concluding that the defendant's sentence must be vacated and remanded
for further sentencing proceedings,98 the court expressed concern
regarding an upward departure based on factors not included in
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id at 639. The Court explained that the defendant's misconduct, which was referred to by the district court judge at the time of sentencing, was adequately accounted for
in the Guidelines and had been part of the determination of the applicable sentence included in the pre-sentence report. Id.
91. Id at 640.
92. 878 F2d 50 (2d Cir 1989).
93. Palta,880 F2d at 640.
94. Cervantes, 878 F2d at 51. Both the plea agreement and the pre-sentence report
contained a sentencing recommendation by the Government of thirty-three to forty-one
months. Id.
95. Id at 52.
96. Id. The sentence imposed included sixty months in prison, five years of supervised release and a mandatory $50 assessment. Id.
97. Id at 54.
98. Id at 56.
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the pre-sentence report and the denial of the corresponding opportunity to be heard. 9 In the court's opinion, the defense in this case
was deprived of any opportunity to comment upon matters
relat10 0
ing to departure, a right flowing from Rule 32(a)(1).
Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits had also interpreted Rule
32(a)(1) as requiring notice to a defendant of a possible upward
departure from the applicable guidelines range prior to sentencing.
In United States v Nuno-Para,'01 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court violated Rule 32(a)(1) in
basing an upward departure from the Guidelines on a factor not
identified as a basis for departure in the pre-sentence report.10 2 In
explaining this requirement, the court stated that a sentencing
court remains free to rely on a factor not identified in the presentence report as a ground for departure, but must provide some
notice of its decision to the defendant.1 03 In a similar decision, the
Fifth Circuit in United States v Otero104 held that an upward departure by the sentencing judge, based on the purity of the cocaine
which the defendant had in his possession, violated Rule 32(a)(1)
because the defendant was not given notice that this may be a
ground for upward departure. 0 5
Other case law has not interpreted Rule 32(a)(1) as affording the
defendant notice of a court's possible upward departure prior to
the sentencing hearing. In United States v George, 0 6 the Fifth
Circuit, ironically citing its decision in the Otero case, held that
the questioning of defense counsel at the time of sentencing as to
why a factor should not result in upward departure gave the defendant adequate opportunity to comment on "matters related to
sentencing" required under Rule 32(a) (1).107 In affirming the defendant's sentence, which was a substantial departure from the
08
Guidelines sentence recommended in the pre-sentence report,
99. Id at 55-56.
100. Id at 56.
101. 877 F2d 1409 (9th Cir 1989).
102. Nuno-Para, 877 F2d at 1415.
103. Id.
104. 868 F2d 1412 (5th Cir 1989).
105. Otero, 868 F2d at 1415. Neither the pre-sentence report nor any action by the
court put the defendant on notice that the court may adjust the sentence upward based on
the purity of the cocaine found in defendant's possession. Id.
106. 911 F2d 1028 (5th Cir 1990).
107. George, 911 F2d at 1029. The court questioned defense counsel regarding the fact
that his client had violated the conditions of his bail by leaving the state. Id.
108. Id. The pre-sentence report recommended a sentence of fifteen to twenty-one
months. The sentence imposed by the judge was fifty months imprisonment followed by
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the court indicated that the defendant did not show how he was
prejudiced by the timing of the notice, how he could have been
assisted by additional notice or time, or that the rule in fact required such additional notice or time. 109 In a similar case, the First
Circuit in United States v Hernandez1 also held that questioning
of defense counsel at the sentencing hearing as to a factor the
court considered relevant to upward departure provided the defendant adequate notice of possible departure, even if the fact is
not one which is raised by the pre-sentence report."' Finally, in
United States v Burns,11 2 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that although subdivision (a)(1) of Rule 32
requires the district court to afford the parties "an opportunity to
comment upon

. .

matters relating to the appropriate sentence"

at the sentencing hearing, the Rule contains no express language
requiring a district court to notify the parties of its intent to make
a sua sponte departure from the Guidelines.113 The Supreme Court
granted certiori to resolve the dispute 1among
the circuits with re14
gard to the mandates of Rule 32(a)(1).

The importance of Rule 32 as amended by the Sentencing Reform Act is most telling when viewed in light of the legislative history of the Act itself. As the majority pointed out, the purpose of
the reform was to eliminate the unwarranted disparties and uncertainty associated with indeterminate sentencing and to achieve
certainty and fairness in sentencing."

5

These goals were to be ac-

complished by limiting the discretion of sentencing judges through
the promulgation of a set of sentencing guidelines. 6 The Guidelines were designed to structure the exercise of discretion in making decisions, primarily to facilitate increased knowledge as to how
differences among offenders or offenses will effect sentences, 117 and
to eliminate or at least lessen the number of scenarios where two
defendants with similar records, found guilty of similar conduct,
three years of supervised release. Id.
109. Id at 1029-30.
110. 896 F2d 642 (1st Cir 1990).
111. Hernandez, 896 F2d at 643-44. The factor in question was the arrest of the defendant for a drug offense when he was out on bail for the crimes committed in the instant
case. Although the presentence report mentioned this occurrence, it stated that no information had been identified which might warrant departure from the Guidelines. Id.
112. 111 S Ct 2182 (1991).
113. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2184.
114. Id.
115. Id at 2184-85.
116. S Rep No 225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess (1983).
117. Id.
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are sentenced to widely disparate sentences by two different
judges. 118 During consideration of the Sentencing Reform Act, the
Senate Appropriations Committee specifically rejected an amendment by Senator Mathias which would have significantly expanded
the circumstances under which judges could depart from the
Guidelines in a particular case, thereby rendering the Guidelines
more voluntary than mandatory." 9 Efforts to add such an amendment to the proposed sentencing legislation were resisted based on
evidence presented to the Appropriations Committee, which indicated the failure of such voluntary guidelines systems in the states
20
which had tried them.
In view of the strong indication of a legislative intent to provide
for a less disparate sentencing scheme through the reduction of judicial discretion as demonstrated above, the majority in Burns
soundly asserted that allowing a sua sponte departure without notice to the defendant "is contrary to all other evidence of congressional intent."' 2' 1 Equally as strong is the majority's contention,
pursuant to Mullane, that the principle that "this right to be
heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed" applied to
Rule 32(a)(1).122 The opportunity to "comment upon . . . matters
relating to the appropriate sentence" provided by Rule 32(a)(1) is
rendered relatively worthless unless the hundreds of possible
choices of items which may be relevant to sentencing under the
Guidelines' 23 are narrowed to the few which the court has determined are crucial. In this respect, the dissent's opinion that specific notice of a sua sponte departure by the court to a defendant
"might be useful to the parties in helping them focus on specific
potential grounds for departure '124 is an understatement at best.
It seems apparent that allowing a sua sponte departure by a
118. Id.
119. Id. The Mathias Amendment would have permitted deviations from the Guidelines whenever a judge determined that the characteristics of the offender or the circumstances of the offense warranted deviation, whether or not the Sentencing Commission had
considered such offense and offender characteristics in the development of the Guidelines.
Id.
120. Id. In testimony before the Appropriations Committee, a District Attorney for
Middlesex County, Massachusetts noted that voluntary guidelines in Massachusetts were
completely ineffective in reducing sentencing disparities in the state because judges generally did not follow them. Id.
121. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2186.
122. Mullane, 339 US at 314.
123. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Ch 1, Pt A, Intro
4(b), p.s.
124. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2191.
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court, without notice to the defendant of the possibility and basis
of such a departure, once again allows for increased discretion on
the part of sentencing judges. Without examining the advantages
or disadvantages to such a system, the majority correctly points
to the legout that this type of discretion is in direct contradiction
12 5
islative intent behind the Sentencing Reform Act.
The more difficult argument is the issue of due process addressed by the majority. As the Court recognized, prior to the enactment of the Guidelines, "particular offense and offender characteristics rarely had a highly specific or required sentencing
consequence.'2 8 The previous indeterminate system did not require the sentencing court to become involved in a fact-finding
process because no single fact had a quantifiable effect on the sentence.2 7 The court was thus free to disregard a fact relevant to
sentencing even if it were proven. 1 28 With the advent of the Guide-

lines system, the courts make many sentencing determinations
based on specific findings of fact, which in turn gives each finding
of fact relevant to sentencing a heightened importance. 12 9 Commentators have pointed to this elevated emphasis on specific facts
under the Guidelines as a reason for requiring greater due process
protections at the sentencing phase. 30 This view is not, however,
without its critics. The Justice Department asserts that greater
formality in sentencing is not required simply because a fact has a
measurable or quantifiable effect on a sentence, and correctly
points out that under the previous indeterminate system a court
made findings of fact which had a material impact on the sentence
without a hearing.' 3 ' Therefore, under the previous system, the defendant was not afforded any type of notice as to the factors upon
which the sentence would be based, and a defendant's due process
125. Id at 2184.
126. Id at 2185, citing United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Official Commentary, § 6A1.3 (West, 1990).
127. Thomas W. Hutchison and David Yellen, Federal Sentencing Law and Practice
405 (West, 1989).
128. Hutchison and Yellen, Federal Sentencing Law and Practice at 405 (cited in
note 127).
129. Id.
130. Id. See also United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Official Commentary, § 6A1.3 (West, 1990); "The court's resolution of disputed sentencing factors will usually have a measurable effect on the applicable punishment. More formality is therefore unavoidable if the sentencing process is to be accurate
and fair." Id.
131. Hutchison and Yellen, Federal Sentencing Law and Practice at 405 (cited in
note 127).

1992

Recent Decisions

1097

rights appear to have been at a much higher risk than the system
now in question. This may be the reason for the summary treat13 2
ment afforded the due process issue by the majority.
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, deals exhaustively
with the due process concerns raised by the case.13 3 Writing for the
dissenters, Justice Souter approaches the due process issue as a
question of what process is due." Using the test announced by the
Court in Mathews v Eldridge, 55 Justice Souter came to the conclusion that Rule 32(a)(1) satisfies due process requirements without demanding notice to a defendant of a sua sponte departure by
the sentencing court. 3 6 Justice Souter noted that both parties have
substantial and contrary interests with regard to the procedural
protections afforded under Rule 32(a) (1).1 s3 He believes, therefore,
that the central due process issues become the risk of error under
the procedures already required and the probable value of a further notice requirement. 138
The dissent saw this risk of error in sentencing, despite the absence of notice to a defendant of a sua sponte departure by a court,
as sufficiently low and rejected the contention that any such notice
requirement exists. 139 In adopting this position, the dissent argued
that the conclusions of fact thought by a sentencing judge to warrant upward departure may be erroneous, but are usually
"presented in the presentence report, and are subject to challenge
and evidentiary resolution under Rule 32(c)(3)(A). ' "'4 This is precisely the issue of the Burns case. The factors for upward departure cited by the Court appeared in the pre-sentence report but
were not emphasized as being facts which would warrant a depar132. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2187.
133. Id at 2191-96.
134. Id at 2192.
135. 424 US 319 (1976). The Mathews test is a three part inquiry, taking into consideration: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proceedings and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burden that the additional
procedural requirement would entail. Mathews, 424 US at 335.
136. Burns, 111 S Ct at 2196.
137. Id at 2193. Justice Souter identified the convicted defendant as having "a lively
concern with the consequences of an erroneous upward departure." He outlined the Government's countervailing interest as one of avoiding the additional drain on judicial resources.
Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id at 2193-94.
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ture.14 1 Without notice that these factors were going to play a substantial role in the sentencing process, they could not be "subject
to challenge and evidentiary resolution under Rule 32(c)(3)(A), ' 14 2
as suggested by Justice Souter's dissent.
Therefore, in deciding that Rule 32(a)(1) requires notice to a defendant of a sua sponte upward departure by a sentencing court
based on a factor not identified as such in the pre-sentence report
or in the Government's pre-hearing submission, the Supreme
Court has recognized the congressional intent to decrease sentence
disparity through the utilization of the Guidelines to limit judicial
discretion. In arriving at this result, the Court has done nothing
more than provide the convicted defendant "the opportunity to
comment upon matters relating to the appropriate sentence,"
which has been mandated by Congress under Rule 32(a)(1), and
dissent attempts
allude to a lurking due process problem when the
143
to become the majority opinion of the future.
Mary Ann Dilanni

141.
142.
143.

Id at 2194 n 5.
Id at 2193-94.
Id at 2187.

